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BÉLA POKOL 
 
 
Forms of Judicial Power 
 
 
The power of the judiciary has been expanding in a number of European and 
Latin American countries in recent years. This phenomenon could be observed 
much earlier, and, in the wake of this observation, comparative studies have 
been launched. Then, in the beginning of the nineties, this expansion was amply 
demonstrated at a conference held in Bologna, Italy (the lectures delivered at 
the conference are included in a volume edited by Neal C. Tate and Torbjörn 
Vallinder in TATE/VALLINDER 1995). However, judicial power made its 
presence felt, and expanded, in a number of additional countries, and this 
phenomenon was not unrelated to a transition to political democracy from 
dictatorship that was going on at that time in many Latin American and East 
European countries. This pattern of development took over these two, very 
different regions, both in terms of culture and society. This happened, in many 
respects, due to motivations and urging emanating from the United States of 
America, including grants and ideological exports, just as the demonstration of 
the judicial power in the United States as an example to follow. Considering its 
role in making decisions in the area of societal management and the 
determination of the political life of the country, American judicial power has 
reached unparalleled heights in the world, and this wide ranging judicial power 
has been emulated in the past decades, and, also, before the nineties. In the 
adaptation of this model, it has been tailored to fit the local structures and 
mechanisms of the legal and political systems in the importing countries. Thus, 
it seems to be expedient to briefly summarize the various forms of judicial 
power in the United States and its operational conditions (1), then to analyze 
the variances that have manifested themselves in the countries of Southern 
Europe, lending new emphases to this power (2), and to examine the 
idiosyncrasies of the judicial power developed in Latin America (3), and, 
finally, to dissect judicial power in Hungary, the country that has forged the 
farthest ahead among the countries of the former Soviet bloc in solidifying an 
independent judiciary (4).  
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1. The model country of the all-round judicial power: the United States of 
America 
 
As a point of departure, it is important to stress that the Constitution of the 
United States, based on the principle of the separation of powers, is, from its 
inception, about judicial power as separate from the legislative and the 
executive branches, but the factual role of the judiciary as a strong, separate 
sphere started to take shape only from the thirties, and, from the fifties on, this 
judicial branch has been expanding with newer and newer forms. Looking back 
at the process of development of the various forms of judicial power on the 
basis of the various conditions arrived at, it seems to be convenient to make a 
distinction between two main directions. One of these directions of the 
development in judiciary power is an increasing participation of the courts in 
making decisions in the control and management of society in addition to 
deciding in the cases of individuals. The other direction is an increasing 
participation of judges in the competition of political groups vying for making 
decisions in the area of societal control in such a way, too, that they were able 
to change the outcome of elections by finding fault with leading politicians and 
government officials criminally or ethically. Let us, then, look at the forms of 
judicial power that have evolved. 
 
1.1. Judicial power as a form of controlling society 
 
In this area, three distinctive forms of judicial power can be separated. These 
forms complement each other and they are the repositories of the role the 
judiciary plays in controlling society. They are as follows: 1) judicial power 
representing the making of rulings in controlling society deduced from the 
stipulations of the federal Constitution, concentrating foremost in the federal 
Supreme Court; 2) the second form represents the judiciary executive power 
which means the supervision of the execution and monitoring of the above 
fundamental rulings and which present themselves at the federal district courts 
by filing thousands of motions requesting institutional remedies; 3) the third 
form is constituted by the judiciary’s task to oversee the regulatory work of 
federal agencies, which can be termed as the empowerment of the federal 
courts to issue orders of implementation. The latter has developed within the 
sphere of activities of the appellate courts at the federal level (cf. SHAPIRO 
1994: 15). 
 
1.1.1. Judicial power to control society 
 
Traditionally, judicial rulings have been made in adjudicating specific, 
individual cases between two contenders, and the judge is able to decide by 
using legal standards that are more or less defined beforehand. An 
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empowerment toward social control has taken place in the United States in such 
a manner that, on the one hand, judges have been enabled to issue rulings over 
global social conflicts instead of specific, individual cases, and, on the other, 
these rulings could be made not along minutely regulating legal norms, but 
abstract constitutional principles and constitutional laws that have provided the 
adjudicators with ample leeway. By these two changes, court rulings have been 
elevated to the level of legislative regulations in legislative bodies, for it is the 
legislature that traditionally makes decisions that control society, as limited by 
the abstract principles of the Constitution. Such a shift in the rulings by the 
judges has been made possible by a development of a judiciary ruling based on 
constitutional rights, that made its first appearance already from the eighteen 
hundreds, and led to serious political tensions in the thirties by continuously 
obstructing the New Deal government and the legislation, but it had reached its 
full potential only by the end of the fifties (cf. EPP 1998:9–23). From that time 
on, a practice started to spread whereby political forces competing to change 
the status quo continued to wage their battle, if defeated in the elections and the 
legislative sparring, at federal level courts by filing lawsuits, and requesting the 
relating laws to be declared unconstitutional, and they tried to convince the 
court, based on constitutional principles or a fundamental right, to issue a ruling 
to change the current social conditions. This way, a number of decisions 
shaping how society functions has been brought by the highest level federal 
judicial forum on the basis of the Constitution, running against the majority 
either in the Congress or the state legislation. This represented the development 
of the power of the judiciary controlling society from the sixties on in the 
United States. 
However, this change could come about only in the midst of various 
preconditions, and they should be given emphasis since, later, the copying of 
this model in other countries has led to different results due to a lack of the 
preconditions existing in the United States. By looking at the farther lying 
social preconditions first, it is important to stress the continued subsidy by 
powerful financial entities contributing to the development of this form of 
judicial power. The financial groups standing behind the American Fund for 
Public Service, operating also as an engine for change, played a decisive role in 
the creation and ongoing financing of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU). This was also demonstrated by the fact that, when the 1929 financial 
crisis led to liquidity woos for the banking sphere, the ACLU stopped operating 
for a while, and it did nothing but agonize until the end of the Second World 
War (cf. Epp’s detailed analysis in EPP 1998:58–59). It seems that the political 
battles waged within the establishment between the financial and commercial 
lobbyists and the conglomerate of the agricultural and industrial entrepreneurs 
accounts, basically, for the partial shift in the decisions to control society to the 
judiciary from the legislative branch. The financial elite that could not change 
the status quo via the ballot box and the legislation forced its way through 
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“constitutionalizing” the judicial rulings and executed, thereby, a shift in 
decisions controlling society in the direction of the courtroom.  
A more direct preconditions for this has been that administrations ran by 
Democrats in the sixties lent their enthusiastic support, in the appointment of 
judges, to law professors and attorneys committed to political fighting via 
litigation and “constitutionalizing” rulings and by having the treasury take over 
the costs of litigation and they assisted the spread of this practice through a 
number of changes in the legal proceedings (cf. SARAT/SCHEINGOLD, 1998:3–
29; EPP:1998:26–43). An important precondition to the the creation of courts 
empowered to control society was the spread of “pro bono law offices” and 
associations and movements working in the field of human rights, which were 
giving incentives to this process by filing thousands of lawsuits, and they have 
been exerting pressure on the courts, instead of using traditional legal 
reasoning, by developing constitutional and human rights arguments (Chayes 
1982). As Charles Epp puts it: in India, members of the Supreme Court have 
become receptive to the American type of social engineering via court rulings, 
but this attempt has been thwarted after a while due to a lack of supporting 
networks of pro-bono law offices (EPP 1998:90–110). Finally, a continued 
support on the part of the national dailies and the mass media has been an 
important precondition to change the prevailing power structure and their 
preference expressed in the interest of increasing the power of the courts vis-à-
vis the legislature. In the case of a mass media hostile to such changes, the 
judges are afraid of facing the pressure coming from an opprobrious and 
indignant public, coupled with a growing power share of the judges. 
 
1.1.2. Judicial executive power 
 
The executive power of the judiciary has been created by the “institutional 
remedy” in the effort that the rulings fought for at the highest judicial forums, 
aimed at controlling society, had to be implemented as against the prevailing 
social conditions, and, therefore, thousands of lawsuits had to be launched 
against the individual institutions. The abolishment of the schools based on 
racial segregation, and, later, the transformation of the life in prison, and the 
enforcement of provisions protecting the environment  against some plants, and 
so on, in a number of other areas, the creation of a new type of schools, jails, 
factories, and other institutions has been  achieved through lawsuits and 
judicial rulings. The main vehicle for this has been the “institutional remedy,” 
by which the court instructed the school, etc. in litigation how to remold its 
operation and its structure with a view to the Constitution (cf. SHAPIRO 
1994:13–15). These lawsuits were processed at the level of the federal district 
courts. If the instructed changes in operation and organization did not 
materialize as a result of the rulings, a complaint could be lodged with these 
courts, and the courts tried to enforce their rulings by applying fines to the non-
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complying schools or other organizations. The compliance had to be checked, 
and, therefore, these courts hired experts. However, as changes in the prevailing 
conditions often forced the courts to change the directives, and, as a result of 
the huge amount of earlier “institutional remedies,” a large number of changes 
in the directives were kept on the courts’ calendar at the same time, and the 
opinions of experts and the collection of data were also necessary to issue 
newer directives (cf. SHAPIRO 1994). Thus, by virtue of the thousands of 
lawsuits, continued judicial power and an army of contracted experts were 
building up around the district courts, in a way redoubling the supervisory role 
of the executive branch over the schools, the penitentiaries and the 
environment. In the wake of this solution applied to the problem, the judiciary 
developed its own executive power in parallel with the executive sphere beside 
the judiciary; the judiciary power controlling society made it necessary to 
develop its own executive power just like earlier the legislative branch had to 
do the same in controlling society. However, while these spheres were separate 
in the case of the legislative branch, in conformity with the principle of the 
separation of powers, this did not happen within the judiciary where the 
executive sphere developed within the judiciary sphere, beside the district 
courts. 
 
1.1.3. Judicial power to issue executive orders 
 
This form of judicial power has been built around the overseeing of executive 
orders, and provides a new political battleground for the clash of the various 
political groups of society. The fact of the matter is that a number of laws 
provide only a general framework for legal regulatory work, and it authorizes 
one of the main agencies of the executive branch to issue detailed regulations. 
For a long time, the regulatory work in the executive sphere has been 
independent from judicial supervision, and it has been an accepted idea that the 
main agencies working with a large expert staff fill the general regulations of 
the laws with provisos and issue detailed regulations (see SHAPIRO 1994). 
However, an increase in the power of the courts and the spread of the battle 
waged via litigation have also led to changes in this field, too, and social groups 
interested in any regulation in relation to a given law have become increasingly 
willing to attack, at the courts, the executive orders that have been inimical to 
their interests by reasoning that it had misinterpreted the basic law and pushed 
rulings to inappropriate directions, such as overregulaton. Judges that have 
become increasingly political in the course of “constitutionalization” started to 
feel more and more friendly toward such attacks. In the course of these 
lawsuits, judges have worked out a number of directives regarding the creation 
of such implementation orders, and, if they have been breached, they 
immediately squashed the executive order issued earlier. Thus, whereas attacks 
against the executive order was an unknown phenomenon during the fifties, 
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there has been practically no executive order that has not been attacked by the 
beginning of the eighties, and, finally, they were the judges who decided on the 
fate of the individual orders. This process engendered hundreds of politically 
motivated litigation, and, thereby judicial power have become increasingly 
engaged in the transformation of society. This form of judicial power has come 
about at the level of federal appellate courts, and it continues to wield influence 
in the battles waged within the American political system. 
 
1.2. The punitive judicial power 
 
It is the United States where a shift in rulings to control society to the 
courtrooms from the legislature has taken place in the most dramatic fashion, 
and it was in that country where this shift has been the most important form of 
manifestation of judicial power within the last decades. However, coupled with 
this shift, judicial power within the area of political struggle developed also in 
another direction that could be described as the tendency to have recourse to 
criminal courts. Until the beginning of the seventies, it had occurred only rarely 
that high-level politicians or government officials used criminal courts as a 
means of the political struggle. We have at our disposal a set of statistics with 
regard to government bureaucrats, which shows the changes there. According 
to these figures, the number of people against whom criminal charges were 
made was under fifty a year during the seventies, and only a half of them were 
convicted, while this number has reached about 1,300 per year by the second 
part of the eighties, and about one thousand of them were convicted (cf. 
LOWI/GINSBERG 1999:135). The rate of increase was similar – at least in terms 
of investigations started – with regard to members of Congress, senators, 
secretaries and undersecretaries. All the while, it has been generally accepted 
that corruption has not grown at all, and all that happened was that the 
following of age-old practices has been increasingly challenged in front of 
criminal law courts. Before we would go into a detailed analysis of this matter, 
let us look at events that helped this trend progress. 
The first spectacular step made in this area was the 1972 Watergate scandal. 
The departing situation here was that President Richard Nixon, a politician of 
the industrial and agricultural conglomerates, got embroiled into an 
increasingly bitter fight with the dominant national media outlets that operate, 
basically, as the presenter of opinions held by banking and financial lobbies, 
their interests and ideology (Halberstam 1988). In order to break the political 
monopoly in the field of opinions of these mass media outlets, Nixon 
threatened with a change in the legal regulations that would have forced the big 
TV corporations to sell their local channels and networks in order to ensure a 
balanced and pluralist diet of news and opinions (cf. LOWI/GINSBERG 1999:34). 
Nixon was re-elected in this quasi-war like situation in 1972. Shortly thereafter, 
The Washington Post, a daily with the most rancorous stance against Nixon, 
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highlighted the details of a secret penetration into the campaign center of the 
Democratic Party among the semi-legal and illegal tricks of the campaign 
battles. Considering that, after a while, the names of Nixon’s close associates 
have also come up in the organization of the penetration, the entire media 
sphere in opposition brought the Watergate scandal to center-stage, and they 
were successful in enforcing the resignation of President Nixon. 
This event, in itself, represented the fighting out of political enmities before 
criminal courts, but, in reality, they were the institutional changes that took 
place thereafter that led, genuinely, toward this direction. The public in general 
perceived the fighting at the highest political level, following the damning 
disclosure and commentaries offered in the mass media, as a moral morass. 
This, in spite of the fact, that similar tricks and illegal activities – even 
stretching to contracted killing – were not at all unknown during earlier 
campaigns. The only difference was that the mass media by then provided 
immense publicity and an atmosphere of ire vis-à-vis their political opponents 
in connection with the events. At any rate, a new institution, the Office of 
Ethics in Government, was set up, and a new law passed in the wake of the 
public outcry, the latter making it possible to start investigation in the case of 
the most minor suspicion of an illegal act, against the President of the United 
States, congressmen, senators and the highest officials. Subsequent events have 
shown that, though the motive was a noble one, the cumulative effects of the 
institution established have proven to be catastrophic. 
The fact of the matter is that if, amidst the conditions of a political contest, 
investigation can be launched in the case of the most minute infraction or its 
suspicion against any of the participants of the contest, and, thereby, the 
position of the contestant can be wronged, the use of this recourse will 
necessarily escalate. An example of this is the case of Michael Espy, secretary 
of urban development in the Clinton administration during the first part of the 
nineties. A law bans the acceptance of gifts for upper level government 
officials, and Espy accepted two tickets (!) to a rugby game from a big food 
company. This was not overlooked by the attention of the vigilant political 
opponents, the republicans, and they immediately demanded the appointment of 
an independent inquirer in the matter, who then, having worked for several 
years with a battery of lawyers and detectives, brought, gradually, President 
Clinton himself and his narrower entourage into the inquest (cf. ETZIONI 2001). 
Finally, Espy resigned. It’s true, the investigators were able, later, to discover 
suspicions of corruption on a larger scale, but it was during the course of this 
case that the regulation itself was not properly thought through, since it 
mentions only “wrongdoing” in order to launch an investigation, and this 
investigation can be started if the politician commits an offence of jaywalking 
in his capacity of a pedestrian (cf. YODER 1999). 
The gist of the institutions developed for the protection of “government 
ethics” is that investigation can be started against a politician in the case of the 
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most minor wrongdoing, and, thereby, it transcends the traditional field of 
criminal justice. This expansion gives unlimited possibilities to discredit the 
political enemy, since it is sufficient just to start the investigation, and no 
conviction is needed. The most recent example of this practice is the case of 
senator Toricelli, who, as a long serving senator of his state, was leading sky-
high above his scarcely known Republican contender. However, when his 
political opponents started to talk about their suspicions about his allegedly 
corrupt practices, his popularity started to nose-dive, and, after a while, he 
himself resigned from participating in the campaign for his re-election as he felt 
he had no chance of winning. (See the commentaries on the case in the summer 
issues of American dailies.) 
An 1978 act regulated the procedure for probing into government ethical 
wrongdoings as follows. If the Attorney General receives any information – 
that is, a report – regarding any politician in a position identified in the act 
giving rise to suspicion of having committed a wrongdoing or criminal act, he is 
obliged to request the appointment of an independent counselor from a special 
panel of judges. If he fails to do it, the informant himself may request the panel 
to appoint such an independent counselor. This special panel consists of three 
federal judges appointed by the highest federal level judicial forum for two 
years. (This appointing has been made during the past 20 years by Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist.) Following the filing of the request, the judiciary panel 
appoints the independent counselor from among lawyers independent from the 
government, and specifies the scope of the investigation. However, the scope of 
investigation is basically unlimited since the purview of the act is extended to 
all related areas of investigation under the control of the independent counselor 
(MASKELL 1998:4–6). The independent counselor, once appointed, is 
unimpeachable even on the part of the President of the United States, and his 
office has a budget guaranteed by law. Many such independent counselors – for 
instance, Kenneth Starr who investigated Clinton – carried on with the 
investigation for eight years, and could block the work of the entire presidential 
administration (ETZIONI 2001b). 
The investigative machinery of ethical-criminal probing was introduced by 
the opponents of the conservative Republicans, the liberal Democrats at the end 
of the seventies, and they used it successfully against the policy of Ronald 
Reagan in the eighties. For instance, an investigation was made into the conduct 
of many of Ronald Reagan’s staff and secretaries during the Iran-Contra affair, 
and, therewith, they were able to limit the political maneuvering space of 
Ronald Reagan and his political program to a large extent (see YODER 1999 
and GRIESBACH 1999). During the presidency of Bush senior at the turn of the 
nineties, this was the incentive that caused the Republicans to wield the weapon 
of ethical investigation on a broad front against Democratic opponents. Using 
the charge indicated above against, first, Jim Wright, they forced the 
Democratic Speaker of the House to resign, and, the Democrats, as a way of 
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response, “got” New Gingrich, the chief organizer of the campaign of 
investigation, and forced him to resign. In his case, ethical investigations were 
directed against his acceptance of an unusually large sum of royalty that he 
signed for his new book, alleging implicit and illicit campaign financing, and 
this was sufficient to force him to resign, facing an irate public. When the 
Democrats won the presidency as well in 1992 with President Clinton, the 
Republicans tried to use this ethical weapon to stymie the work of his 
presidential machinery, just as their opponents had done during the Reagan 
years. They used, as a pretext, the already mentioned Espy case. However, the 
real success was the trophy of the President himself by the second half of the 
nineties when the Lewinski affair caused a tectonic shift in voters’ preferences 
and in the body politic. 
Thus, the arm of ethical-criminal probe wielded and perfected from the 
beginning of the seventies have been used in  recent years as a standard part of 
the political arsenal, and analysts demonstrate three major negative effects in 
this regard. The most important effect is that the mutual revelations, the 
dramatized demonstration of “moral cesspool” on the other side, make people 
stay away from politics. While in earlier times, the rate of participation in 
elections in the United States varied between 60 and 80 percent, just as  in the 
countries of Western Europe, this rate fell to 30 to 33 percent in legislative 
elections, and it is already only about 50 percent in presidential elections 
(LOWI/GRINSBERG 1999:48). Another negative effect is a radical narrowing of 
the administration’s scope of action, since, in essence, any higher ranking 
politician becomes immediately impeachable no matter how slight the offence 
is, and no one can be certain if there has been a genuine act of wrongdoing until 
the completion of the investigation. Finally, a third effect is the negative 
selection of politicians and public administrators as a result. Whoever is 
capable of going to the private sphere and may have a choice, would rather opt 
for a career in the private sector, and only the losers of that sphere and those 
that are willing to do “dirty tricks” would go to politics. All this of course 
reduces trust in the state to a minimum (ETZIONI 2001). 
 
 
2. Modified form of judicial power in Southern Europe 
 
As against the solution accepted in the United States, the practice of 
“constitutionalization” has not become a task of the ordinary courts, but, 
wherever it has come about, a specially organized constitutional court takes 
care of these matters. As a rule, such a judiciary panel does not consist of 
career judges, but law professors engaged in politics and lawyers, and such a 
constitutional court functions as a counterbalance of a parliamentary majority 
in accepting bills, and it does not have a function of ruling in individual, 
specific cases. (According to Stephen Holmes, such constitutional courts 
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should not be considered courts, but a special kind of second parliamentary 
chamber which makes the quick implementation of the plans to change new 
laws difficult, and makes necessary newer considerations under the heading of 
the constitutional verification process). This is especially true in the case of 
European constitutional courts where the verification of this agency is directed 
only towards the legislation, and, in the case of court rulings, the interpretation 
of the constitutional court is not taken into consideration, but this interpretation 
of the law represents the monopoly of the highest court of the country. 
Therefore, I will not make a detour to deal with the power of the constitutional 
courts, but I will only touch upon the issue if it has a bearing on the activities of 
the ordinary courts.  
In Europe, it has been a tradition for the judges not to meddle in politics, but 
the entire structure of the legal culture (the style of ruling tied to the provisions 
of the laws, the socialization of the disciplined legal-dogmatic measures, and 
the age old tradition of the political neutrality of the judges, etc.) stood in 
contrast to the development of the power of the judiciary. From the end of the 
fifties on, changes occurred, first, in Italy, then, also taking the Italian example 
into consideration by Spain and Portugal, two countries that started out on the 
road to democracy in the beginning of the seventies, and where new 
constitutions were also adopted. Let us have a look at the forms of appearance 
of the judicial power in these two countries. 
 
2.1. Judicial power in Italy 
 
For a long time, the judicial branch in Italy had been functioning just like in the 
rest of Continental Europe: a judicial culture strictly following the legal 
provisions and the legal-dogmatic categories; a de-politicized judiciary and 
administration of the judiciary by the Ministry of Justice. A departure could be 
observed from the years immediately after World War II. This story shows 
unequivocally the immediate causes and procedures having emerged in a 
number of countries. Casting a look at all the developments that can be 
observed in several South-European countries, we can conclude that if the 
prevailing value judgements of the judges in a country (even if they do not 
participate in the day-to-day political fighting) are closer to a dominant political 
force, and, from the other side, the instability of the relations of power of the 
parliamentary parties make probable a changing parliamentary majority, then 
the dominant party of the day, by profiting from its given parliamentary 
majority, tries to separate the judges from the parliamentary majority at any 
given time in the hope that the shift in the judicial power to autonomy would 
strengthen its position, and, at the same time, it could prevent the access of 
political forces rallying behind the subsequent governments to the judges by 
this maneuver. This was the situation in Italy toward the end of the forties, and 
the Christian Democrats in Italy managed to include the self-governance of the 
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judges, thus isolating the judicial sphere from the government of the day. 
However, after they had won a stable majority at the 1948 elections, and it 
seemed reasonable to expect that they would continue to have a majority for 
several terms, they were in no rush at all to implement this, and, indeed, they 
created the Supreme Judicial Council in 1959, fourteen years later, as a 
supreme body of self-governance when the elections started to indicate the 
weakening of their hegemony. In contrast, the Communists and the Socialists 
that did not have political sympathies within the judiciary regarded the fact that 
the election of the members of this supreme body was tied to casting of votes 
within the judiciary and isolated from the parliamentary majority as an 
“authoritarian distortion” of the parliamentary form of government 
(GUARNIERI/MAGALHAES 2001:26). However, this situation did not last long, 
as the small number of judges and attorneys started to increase precipitously 
from the sixties due to the increasing importance of the law in conflict 
resolutions of everyday life, and the internal conflicts of the judiciary, getting 
ever serious, between the conservative views of elderly judges of the appellate 
courts and the left-leaning activism of the younger judges of the lower level 
courts, tipped the balance of power within the judiciary. The first step in this 
process was that the activist, younger judges harboring left-wing sympathies 
created their own, independent association, and they started to organize the 
election of activist judges into the Supreme Judiciary Council. The next step of 
this association was to start establishing tight relations with members of the 
Communist, and, to a lesser extent, the Socialist parliamentary factions. After 
this, the supreme judicial self-governing body brought, amidst sharp political 
divisions and continuous in-fighting, decisions regarding the promotion of 
judges and the nomination of judges to superior court positions depending on 
which side the appointee had manifested its political stance. In this system, the 
promotion of judges started to become more and more contingent upon an 
affiliation of the particular judge to a political lager, and, as a consequence, the 
Italian judiciary has become totally politicized by the early nineties, and it has 
disintegrated into organizations that have been waging war against each other 
(“brown judges” and “red judges,” as the saying goes), and these warring 
judicial factions were fighting each other also in the supreme judicial self-
governance (HORVÁTH 2000:5; FERRARESE 2001:7–8). 
The image of the autonomous and politicized judiciary in Italy conforms 
perfectly to the one that I have outlined with regard to the United States, 
although two circumstances have pushed the Italian judiciary power to a 
different direction. One of these circumstances has been that the Court of 
Cassation representing the supreme ruling judicial forum prevented the 
“constitutionalization” of the individual judicial rulings in Italy, that is, the 
building of rulings immediately onto constitutional “goals,” “fundamental 
principles,” etc. This was done by such a way that it dissected the text of the 
Constitution to three layers: norms providing programs that give guidance only 
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to the legislation with regard to the content of subsequent bills; norms to be 
implemented, which, although they include constitutional provisions, should be 
specified by laws, and the judges have to use these norms of the Constitution 
indirectly; and, finally, the immediately effective norms represent the third layer 
of the text of the Constitution that the judges use in their rulings directly. Since 
the latter mean specific provisions applied to exactly defined situations, and not 
abstract objectives, the judges were not given the privilege of a “creative” 
interpretation of the Constitution, which was used by their American 
counterpart to free themselves from under the obligations of the laws. Thus, in 
this manner, the politicized judicial power in Italy could not interfere into the 
basic issues of societal control, and it remained tied to the laws passed by the 
parliament. 
A break-out was made possible by another peculiar circumstance in Italy in 
the role the Italian judiciary was playing in the power game. The fact of the 
matter was that, beginning with the seventies, the legal position of the state 
prosecutors started to become similar to that of the judges in order to give the 
prosecutors a freer hand vis-à-vis the public administrators that might have 
became corrupt. In the course of this, the education of the prosecutors and that 
of the judges, and, then, their professional organizations became completely 
intertwined, and, as a result, the organization of the prosecutors became entirely 
separate from the government. Along the lines explained above, the 
organization of the judges and the prosecutors have become thoroughly 
politicized in addition to having become intertwined. In contradistinction to 
most of the West European countries, the judges and prosecutors are not 
banned there to manifest their political beliefs and even to accept party 
functions. It happens than that, often, “red” judges clash with “brown” judges 
during street demonstrations, but, the same way, a parliamentary membership 
representing a political party can also be part and parcel of the career of an 
Italian state prosecutor (cf. FERRARESE 2001; HORVÁTH 2000).  
As a matter of fact, this power of the prosecutors and the judges created, 
from 1992, a “criminalization of political responsibility, which, at the time of 
the movement of the Clean Hands, toppled the entire political elite, save the 
Communists that were well-night excluded by this political elite. Although, in 
the beginning, the Socialists cooperated with the activists left-wing judges at 
the time of the governance of the Christian Democrats, but, from the mid-
eighties, they were trying, in the government and under the leadership of 
Bettino Craxi,  to roll back the frayed judicial power. For instance, they were 
trying to establish the civil law responsibility of the judges by amendments of 
the laws, reaping, as a result, considerable resistance on the part of the judges 
(GUARNIERI/MAGALHAES 2001:46). The activities of the Clean Hands broke 
the backbone of the earlier political elite, and, after that, the new right 
competing with the Communists, the only force left from the old parties, and 
they were even successful in depriving the Forza Italia founded by Berlusconi 
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of its grip on the government. The criminalization of the political battle is an 
Italian specialty, added by the autonomous and politicized  Italian judicial 
power, to the Italian power game, thereby also providing a model for judicial 
power plays going on in other countries. 
Yet another very important difference between the Italian judicial power and 
its counterpart in the United States should be mentioned, and this is also valid 
with regard to the judicial power in the rest of the European and Latin 
American countries vis-à-vis the United States. The essence of this difference is 
that whereas in the United States the federal-level judiciary exercising national 
judicial power is unable to influence directly the individual judges in their 
ruling, in the Italian case and the cases of other countries the individual judge – 
while separated and made independent from the influence of the rest of the 
branches of power – is profoundly subordinated to the self-governing bodies of 
the judiciary and their supervising judiciary-political organizations. The fact of 
the matter is that these self-governing organizations of the judiciary make 
decisions in the appointment and promotion of judges and other forms of 
changes in the career and remuneration of the judges. If a judge does not join 
an internal political organization of the judges, or if he/she joins it, but his/her 
rulings are different from the expectation of these organizations, he/she does 
not even have the remotest chance of making a career, not to mention the fact 
that he/she may expect disciplinary actions in matters brought up as a pretext. 
In contrast, federal judges in the United States are nominated for life, they 
cannot be removed, and no judiciary body has authority over them. In 
summarizing, the exposure of the individual judges to the new corporative 
judiciary power should be stressed in the case of the individual judges in the 
countries of Europe and Latin America, whereas the independence of the 
individual judges remained stronger in the American judiciary vis-à-vis the 
entire body of judges and not only the executive and the legislative branches of 
power. 
 
2.2. The Spanish judicial power 
 
The departing situation was similar both in the establishment of the Spanish 
judicial power, as we have seen during the above discussion of the Italian case. 
The judiciary, and, especially, the majority of the judges of the appellate courts, 
had a conservative political stance. This also led to the fact that while the 
conservative Union del Centro Democratica (UCD) enthusiastically supported 
those efforts within the judiciary that created the judiciary self-governance and 
its separation from the parliamentary majority, the Communists and the 
Socialists were sharply opposing these efforts. At the 1979 parliamentary 
elections the conservative forces supporting this separation emerged victorious, 
and especially since they could govern only with a slight majority, they created 
the supreme judicial self-governing organization, the Consejo Superior del 
320 – BÉLA POKOL  
Poder Judicial, that is, the Council of Supreme Judicial Power, in 1980, before 
the foreseeable change of government, and, by this, they separated  the 
judiciary sphere entirely from the government and the legislative majority 
(GUARNIERI/MAGALHAES 2001:24 and WELLHAMMER 2001). The 12 judges 
elected by the judges had a solid majority in the Consejo, and every judicial 
appointment, every judicial appointment to leading positions, disciplinary 
action, transfer, etc. have become the bailiwick of this Consejo. The 
conservative leaning judges had a dominant influence in the Society of Career 
Judges, and they set a very high  minimally required membership of newly 
established judicial organizations in order to thwart the emergence of politically 
opposing forces, and this provided an efficient defense against the 
disintegration of the judiciary to the detriment of the conservative majority. The 
socialists wanted to break this conservative dominance when they got elected to 
govern in 1983, and they carried out the “parlamentarization” of the Consejo in 
1985 by using their parliamentary majority, that is, members of the Consejo got 
elected, including the twelve career judges, from that moment on by the 
legislation. This reinforced the development of political forces within the 
Spanish judiciary, and their forming of alliances with their ideologically 
kindred political parties. However, this has not yet reached the level of internal 
political fragmentation of the Italian judiciary. In spite of this, internal political 
fighting already made its debut within the Spanish judiciary, and in 1999, for 
instance, the majority of the Consejo with its pro-Socialist sympathies 
conducted disciplinary actions vis-à-vis judges reputed to be conservatives, 
thereby triggering considerable storms among politicians and in the public (cf. 
GUARNIERI/MAGALHAES 2001:73). 
In such a way, even if the Spanish self-governing judiciary did not return to 
be governed entirely by the parliamentary government majority – due to the 
staggered terms of the parliament and of the Consejo –, the judiciary gets 
attached to the government majority in the case of a longer and more stable 
parliamentary majority. The fact of the matter is that if a government majority 
lasts for two terms, the reelection of the Consejo will be its fruit to pick, and, 
by its majority, the government will be able to make the Consejo reflect its own 
image. This possibility reduces the weight of the independent judiciary in Spain 
in relation to the power of the judiciary both in Italy and the United States. The 
weight of the judiciary is rendered lighter also by the fact that in Spain the 
prosecution is operating solidly under the government, and, thus, even if an 
action against the parliamentary majority emerges on the part of the judges, the 
prosecution will not support it, just like in Italy, in the case of the “Clean 
Hands.” However, it could be seen in the beginning of the nineties that if a 
judiciary inquire was launched against members of the Socialists’ government 
for corruption, the conservative Partido Popular in opposition and the daily El 
Mundo ensured the greatest possible publicity and support to this inquiry. It 
goes without saying that such an inquiry was rare within the judiciary, since the 
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socialists had a solid majority within the Consejo, that is, the supreme self-
governing body of the judiciary, and the conservatives in opposition were rather 
accusing the government of the Socialists during these years that it was starting, 
by instigating its friends in the Consejo, politically motivated disciplinary and 
investigative procedures against members of that supreme judicial body whose 
ruling practices they did not like (GUARNIERI/MAGALHAES 2001:74). However, 
the partial independence of the judiciary from the government was shown by 
the fact that even the Minister of the Interior could be put in the dock for secret 
government actions in connection with the ETA, and a criminal action was 
pursued from 1995 going all the way to Felipe Gonzales, the Prime Minister, 
and this also contributed to the fall of the socialist government. 
It can be seen then that the Spanish judiciary power is only partially 
independent in relation to its Italian counterpart, and it is less politicized than 
the Italian judiciary. This has also contributed to the fact that although in Spain 
there has also been progress in the “criminalization of the political 
responsibility”, in Spain it was only the government and not the entire system 
that could be toppled as it was the case in Italy.  
Of the components of the power of the judiciary – beside independence and 
politicization –, the third element was the transposition of the judiciary ruling 
onto a free instance of deliberation, which is shown in its most mature form by 
the judiciary power in the United States, and we have seen that it has remained 
limited in Italy. What is the situation in this respect in Spain? The answer to 
this question can only be that although the change of the ruling practice there 
was completed on a broader base than in Italy by using constitutional 
provisions, objectives, and fundamental principles in sentencing, it lagged by a 
long shot behind the extent of transformation experienced in the United States. 
Spaniards may take recourse to the constitutional complaint (“amparo”) if they 
feel their constitutional rights have been wronged by the action of a 
governmental body or agency, and an overwhelming majority of these 
complaints represent, in practice, an attack against court verdicts. (The number 
of amparos filed with the Spanish constitutional judges is about two thousand a 
year.) By this, the constitutional watchdogs have become the foremost judicial 
forum above the ordinary courts, but, in the Spanish legal sphere, this has 
remained with the Constitutional Court to rule on individual cases, and the 
lawsuits have not been used, as in the United States, in overall social issues. 
That is, the practice of using the amparo has become an area of deciding on 
narrow legal matters, and they have not been transformed into rulings over 
social control. In the United States, political activist law associations and “pro-
bono law offices” and similar entities enrobed in human rights garb have been 
born, and, according to information, this legal activist background has not been 
developed in Spain. Thus, an otherwise appropriate institutional framework has 
not developed into a practice of political litigation based on the constitution (cf. 
EPP 1998; SARAT/SCHEINGOLD 1998). In spite of this, a recurring critique 
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within the Spanish judiciary is the meddling of a “politicized constitutional 
court” into the ruling practices of the judiciary (cf. GUARNIERI/MAGALHAES 
2001:44). 
 
2.3. Portuguese judicial power 
 
In Portugal, the transition to dictatorship from democracy proceeded, from the 
seventies onward,  by causing more ruptures than in Spain, where, in essence, 
the ruling elite itself managed the transition. The role of the upper echelon of 
the Portuguese army presiding over the change of the system also found its 
echo for a few years during this transformation in a body standing above the 
parliament (Conselho da Revoluçao), and the absoluteness of the elected 
supreme power came into being only from 1982 (cf. GUARNIERI/MAGALHAES 
2001:24). With regard to the judicial sphere, the departing situation was the 
same as we have seen with the Spaniards: an apolitical judiciary attached to the 
provisions of the law, which was conservative in terms of its values, and, 
therefore, the more conservative political forces went to the battlefield to bring 
about the separation of the judiciary from the parliamentary majority (the 
center-right Partido Populare Democratico – PPD/PSD – and the conservative 
Centro Democratico Social – CDS – were anchored here), whereas the 
Socialists and the Communists here, too, were militating to the election of the 
judiciary self-governing body by the parliamentary majority. 
At that time, the parliamentary balance of power favored the right-of-center 
and conservative forces, and, this way, the judiciary sphere, coming together in 
the supreme self-governing body in 1976, became separated from the actually 
prevailing parliamentary majority. However, unlike in Spain, the Portuguese 
Socialists, dominating in the eighties, were not able to revert this body to be 
under parliamentary control, and the majority of this body remained to be 
elected by the judges, i.e., from inside. However, it was not only the apex of the 
judiciary power that continued to be independent from the parliamentary 
majority of the day, but considerable autonomy has also come about with 
regard to the prosecution, that is, we can here talk about a case similar to the 
one in Italy and a judiciary power (of the judges and the prosecutors) separated 
from the government (GUARNIERI/MAGALHAES 2001:74). However, there is an 
important difference vis-à-vis the Italian situation with regard to the case of the 
power of the Portuguese judges and prosecutors. The fact of the matter is that, 
contrary to the Italian conditions, but quite unlike the Spanish judges that have 
remained less politicized, the Portuguese judges remained in a state of complete 
depoliticization, and it never remonstrated against the government or the 
parliamentary majority in matters political. This, however, does not apply to the 
independent Portuguese prosecutors. We should indicate that their 
independence have come about in such a manner that the chief prosecutor is 
nominated, and may be recalled, by the head of government and the head of the 
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state jointly. This legal framework has been filled with life both for the chief 
prosecutor and his underlings in the sense that, for years on, the antagonistic 
political forces provided their appointees with these posts. It is to be noticed 
that the Portuguese Constitution gives a much stronger power to the head of the 
state compared to a head of state possessing symbolic power, and the 
parliamentary opposition could obtain important positions by relying on the 
head of state. In the backdrop of a competing head of state and government 
power, it is understandable that, up until the nineties, the chief prosecutor – 
and, with him, the entire hierarchy, was unapproachable from the part of the 
government. That was not so with regard to the opposition as Cunha Rodrigues, 
the Chief Prosecutor, whose position was firmly anchored, has gradually 
become the chief clashing point vis-à-vis the government during the period of 
1987 to 1995 (GUARNIERI/MAGALHAES 2001:75). In the clashes between the 
head of state and the parliamentary majority, the Chief Prosecutor and the 
public prosecutor’s office have increasingly functioned as if it were looking at 
cases from the point of view of the opposition, and, as cheered on by the media, 
one of their main targets has increasingly become the exposure of corruption by 
high government officials. This, however, came to an abrupt halt with the 
electoral victory of the Socialists in 1995, the reason for this being that the head 
of state and the head of government were of the same “camp” and this, 
understandable, dampened the zeal of the prosecutors in “criminalizing the 
political responsibility.” Thus, the Portuguese Prosecutor’s Office was forging 
ahead  with its political mission for years, but it is important to stress that this 
has not led to the disintegration of the area of prosecution into internal political 
fractions, in contradistinction to the Italian case. Rather, it was the willingness 
of the Portuguese Chief Prosecutor, a charismatic person who did not hide his 
politically ambitions, to play a role, and the “trickle-down” effect of this role-
playing to the lower rungs of the hierarchy led to a politicization of the 
prosecution. 
We have seen the situation of the independence of the judiciary from the 
government, the nature of politicization, and, now, the question must be posed 
as to what has happened with regard to the change-over of the judges to issue 
verdicts on the basis of free deliberation. This phenomenon exercises a decisive 
influence on the evolution of the power of the courts and the prosecution. A 
brief answer to this can be that the activism of the judges in Portugal has not 
reached the level of that in Spain. Although the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court has also become the last resort for appeals in the individual lawsuits (the 
losing party may attack the verdict by referring to unconstitutionality), but it 
has not led to an activist legislation hovering about the precise provisions of the 
laws, similarly to the Spanish case. In summary, the conclusion can be drawn 
that, in Portugal, the judiciary power created structurally and at the level of the 
laws has not become a battlefield of independent political forces, and such 
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striving shown by the prosecution has been blocked, following charges laid in 
politically colored cases, by the depoliticized courts themselves.  
 
 
3. Judicial power in Latin America 
 
Due to our different social and cultural conditions, we usually do not turn much 
attention to this region, and the geographic distance does not whet our interest 
either. However, in examining judicial power, we cannot afford to ignore that 
region for two reasons. One of these reasons is that judicial power has reached 
unusual heights in the countries of Latin America and the other reason is that 
this strong judicial power has developed there, just like in the countries of 
Southern Europe and in the post-Communist countries after 1989, during the 
transitory period to democracy from dictatorship. We can also say that the 
establishment of the judicial power has been planned and implemented in these 
countries as a result of the operation of the democratic institutions regarded 
skeptically and as their surrogate, and this has been a factor in the 
developments experienced of the countries in transition in Southern Europe and 
Central Europe. 
(El Salvador) El Salvador introduced the institution of a Human Rights 
Prosecutor in 1991 within the framework of a constitutional reform, and it was, 
basically, an “upgraded” ombudsman-type of office. The position has been 
filled, ever since, with an appointee of the National Assembly’s two-third 
majority, and he/she has the task of exposing, in addition to human rights 
complaints, misuse and abuse of power in public offices. He/she is elected for a 
3-year, renewable term. The first elected official, Carlos Molina Fonseca could 
fulfill only parts of his functions as the United Nations Mission took over a 
number of functions from him in 1991 to 1994. However, the second official 
elected to the office, Victorio de Avilés, who was the deputy of Fonseca, could 
already function as mandated. However, the governing party of the time looked 
at him, a man with the full backing of the media, as the enthusiastic supporter 
of leftist agendas, and, this way, he was not re-elected. The third man in the 
office was Eduardo Penata, but, during his reign, his office was more reticent 
(DODSON/JACKSON 2000:15–25). 
In addition, the sphere of the judiciary, taken in a narrower sense, has also 
been transformed in El Salvador from the beginning of the nineties. In the 
period of 1985 to 1987, a sum of 331 million dollars was spent on this sphere 
financed, mostly, by the Inter-American Development Bank. A National 
Council of Justice was established, overseeing the career of the judges, the 
judiciary nominations, disciplinary actions, and the education of judges. 
According to empirical surveys, the parties control the judiciary sphere through 
judges elected into the National Council, that is, the separation from the parties 
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is not complete, and the individual judges can be influenced via the self-
governing body of the judges. Not to mention the important fact if a judge does 
not issue the proper verdict in a manner that is expected from him by political 
forces, an investigation can be launched against him on spurious grounds. A 
judge going against strong economic and/or financial interests may soon find 
himself under investigation (BARTON 1997; DODSON/JACKSON 2000:15). 
(Guatemala) As a point of departure, it is important to note that, here, the 
government was successful in crushing the guerillas more brutally than in El 
Salvador, and, following a repressive cycle of governance during the nineties, 
as egged on and supported by the United States, the government itself led the 
democratization process. In addition, it was also important that the National 
Action Party, presiding over the agreement, was a new and a rootless party, and 
its opposition, the United Revolutionary Party, managed only to achieve minor 
electoral results. Thus, while the institutional reform of the transition has been 
overseen by two political forces, they had no strong positions within society. 
Other groups had their hold over these societal positions, and, in such a way, a 
“parallel power situation” characterized both the transition and the period after 
it (DODSON/JACKSON 2000:17). It followed from this that the new institutions, 
such as the judiciary sphere, were invaded by persons coming from the 
economic sector that was independent from the government. For instance, the 
judiciary played an ignominious role in stopping the transition in 1993. The 
Supreme Court has also been thoroughly politicized, but exercised no control 
over the government. It is characteristic of American financial interests that 
Americans provided 116 million dollars in 1997 to support the reform of the 
sphere of justice. Members of the Supreme Court are elected by the legislation 
for five years, and, after that, these members appoint the judges to all the lower 
level courts. In 1998, all the members of the Supreme Court were renewed, and 
not a single Supreme Court justice was re-elected. It is characteristic of the new 
members of the Supreme Court that they were appointed from candidates who 
had not had any training in the Center for the Education of Judges. The 
Supreme Court does not prefer those judges that complain about some misuse, 
and, instead of an inquiry being launched, they are usually transferred to 
another position. And, to boot, the National Council of Justice does not do 
anything to protect such justices, although it would have the duty to do so. Yet 
another problem for the American specialists supporting the reform is that the 
idea of human rights has been discredited in Guatemala, since it is an accepted 
opinion there that the guerilla war itself was due, mostly, to the fact that the 
guerilla organizations themselves had developed along the lines of the human 
rights ideology exported from the United States, and, after a while, they started 
their armed struggle. Thus, there is considerable skepticism there in the new 
process of democratization vis-à-vis the human rights ideology. 
326 – BÉLA POKOL  
Guatemala also has a Human Rights Prosecutor who was, back in the early 
nineties, quite active, but, in the past years, he has become politicized in favor 
of the government, and, today, his position serves more like a springboard to 
other political posts. Thus, there is no horizontal check on the government, 
contend two authors who think in the evident terms of the separation of powers 
(DODSON/JACKSON 2000:21). 
(Columbia) From the point of view of an overall social-political situation, it is 
important to note that Columbia was a place of stability in Latin America until 
the start of the drug war in 1984. From the end of the fifties, following Rojas 
Pinella’s military dictatorship, two parties, the Liberal Party and the 
Conservative Party, united in a National Front, and managed society until 1974 
without fluttering an eyelash. This was done by using tough methods, with the 
minimum of democratic guarantees, and it was only in the mid-seventies when 
a gradual liberalization started, but, from the mid-eighties the drug war made 
imperative the introduction of the state of emergency on many occasions. 
Finally, a new constitution was passed in 1991 under the pressure, and with 
strong support, of the United States.  
The development of the judiciary can be understood from looking at it from 
this background. The fact of the matter is that the two parties constituting the 
National Front sent their own men to every and each position of power on a 
parity basis, but, in the judiciary, the positions in the Supreme Court have been 
filled, following the reform of the Constitution in 1957, for life. In addition, the 
principle of co-opting has been introduced at the court level, following the 
filling of positions with judges elected for life. This way, they cut the judiciary 
from the rest of the powers. In the mold of the French model, the supreme 
justices, nominated for life, or, more precisely, until retirement, sitting on the 
two most senior judiciary panels, the Supreme Court and the Council of State, 
they themselves have already for a long time been co-opting the successors of 
the departing judges, but they were also those that have appointed judges to the 
lower courts. In this situation, the critique aimed at a “judiciary clientele” has 
often been leveled (HAMMERGREN 1998). 
Although the supreme judiciary bodies have been authorized to do a 
constitutional check on the provisions of the legislation and the execution of the 
laws, they have been exercising this power only in a very limited manner. They 
have rationalized this low-key approach with a conclusion that the provision in 
question is more of a political rather than a legal character, and they attacked 
the provision only if it was in formal contradiction to the Constitution. This 
restraint may also be accounted for the fact that their budget, the geographical 
location, and the size of their administrative staff have been under the control 
of the Ministry of Justice and, this way, the judiciary has been under control to 
a certain extent. 
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At the end of the seventies, the President of the country attempted to curb 
the judiciary’s power as it was manifest in its composition, but the supreme 
court judges flung into action, and they squashed, these legal provisions ruling 
them unconstitutional. That was the time when an activist type of ruling started 
and that has become the order of the day ever since the transformation in 1991. 
The legislation and the head of state embarked upon a political reform in the 
second half of the eighties, but the highest judiciary forum stood in its way in 
every form and vetoed it. At that point in time, a Constitutional Convention was 
summoned in order to circumvent the opposing force of the judiciary. This 
Convention intended, initially, only to reform the 1886 Constitution, but 
members of the convention decided with a majority of the votes to frame an 
entire new Constitution. The new Constitution has radically transformed a 
number of earlier solutions (SPRINGER 1998:9). Two important changes should 
be mentioned with regard to the courts: on the one hand, it increased the 
independence of the independence of the judiciary, but, on the other hand, it 
went about "weeding out” judges from many areas, due to the extreme judiciary 
activity of the past. 
By looking at the specific changes in the judiciary, the most important 
change has been that the life-long appointment of the judges has been 
terminated, and, instead, election for an eight-year cycle was introduced, with 
no possibility of the renewal of the term. A National Council of Judges was 
also set up there as the highest local government body of the judiciary sphere, 
thereby separating these tasks from the authority of the two highest judicial 
forums. An additional change has been to set up a separate constitutional court, 
with judges also elected for eight, not renewable, years. However, the election 
of the three judicial forums is done in a different manner. Members of the 
Supreme Court and the National Council are elected by judges of the entire 
judiciary from a list composed by the National Council of Judges, although 
only those persons can be included in this list who has not functioned as a 
judge for at least a year prior to his/her election, and he/she may not function as 
a judge either following the termination of the cycle. By this, they attempted to 
prevent the formation of cliques and other types of informal coalition building 
within the judiciary (KUGLER/ROSENTHAL 2000:23). The National Judicial 
Council appoints the members of the lower courts to an indefinite period of 
times. The Senate elects the constitutional judges from a list prepared by the 
head of state, and, this way, this body has nothing to do with the judiciary 
sphere.  
The uppermost organ of the judiciary is the National Judicial Council that 
has two chambers with 7 members each. Members of the administrative 
chamber are selected for eight years by the supreme judicial forums and the 
members of the disciplinary chamber are elected by Congress for the same 
term. This body is also responsible for the budget and administration of the 
judiciary; its supply with staff, etc. It should also be noted that, in the beginning 
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of the nineties, considerable power clashes occurred among the three supreme 
judiciary forums after the fact that the constitutional judges squashed a great 
number of rulings of the other two supreme judiciary bodies on constitutional 
grounds, but, in the meantime, they recognized its primacy. 
The highest prosecution forum has been accorded an independence even 
greater than that of the judiciary in terms of budget and other considerations, 
and its ties to the executive have been completely severed. 
The Colombian judiciary was very active in the nineties as well. For 
instance, the Consejo de Estado (State Council) dragged to court a good 
number of MPs, and, as a result, they lost their seats. However, the office of the 
General Prosecutor was also very active in this area, and it initiated and 
pursued a number of cases against politicians in office. Its main target has 
consistently been Ernesto Samper Pizano, head of state from 1994 to 1998, 
although, ultimately, a special committee of the legislation did not condemn the 
head of state. However, as a result of the prosecutors, ministers, party bosses 
and representatives have been accused. A critique leveled against them was that 
they were rather going after politicians than serial offenders (cf. SPRINGER 
1998:16; KUGLER/ROSENTHAL 2000:24). 
The Constitutional Court is especially active thanks to the accion de tutela – 
rough equivalent of the Spanish amparo –, and it runs about 500 constitutional 
checks on decisions made by the government and the public administration. 
About half of them are decided in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
government (SPRINGER 1998:21). However, the number of laws and decrees by 
the head of states squashed on constitutional grounds is also high. On an 
average, about 200 such checks are made annually of which about one third 
ends up in the squashing of the legislative provision objected to. 
In summary, we can say that the judiciary has amassed an extraordinary 
amount of power in Columbia, and the “criminalization of the political 
responsibility” has been done there just as in the model of Southern Europe as a 
result of the cooperation between the office of the prosecution that has become 
entirely independent and the State Council and an abstract check on the basis of 
the Constitution, on the American model of the activist constitutional judges. 
The only impediment to a long-term stability and the full enfolding of a 
judiciary and prosecution sphere inaccessible from without is that members of 
the National Judiciary Council can be elected only from lawyers that are not 
judges, and this is done by bodies that work outside the judiciary. 
(Costa Rica) Here, the accepted Latin American model represented, from the 
end of the fifties, the judiciary power: the parliamentary majority or the 
strongest parliamentary parties elect, on the basis of parity, members of the 
supreme judiciary forum who, in turn, nominate all judges of the lower court. 
They also decide about their promotion, transfer and disciplinary actions 
against them. However, in contradistinction to most of the countries in Latin 
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America, a body of judges has been established in Costa Rica within the 
highest judiciary forum, and, thus, the self-organizing capability of the 
judiciary was able to become permanent. The fact of the matter is that the 
members of the Supreme Court have been, and are being, elected for a term of 
eight years with the simple majority of the legislation in such a manner that 
they should be considered re-elected following the expiration of their term 
unless the legislature decides, with a two-third majority, the termination of 
some of the offices of judges (WILSON/HANDBERG 1998). Considering that this 
takes place only very rarely, the judiciary has been functioning separately from 
the rest of the branches of power. Here, social conditions have been more 
consolidated than in most of the Latin American countries of the time. For 
instance, the military has been disbanded after 1949; the clout of the head of 
state has been deliberately whittled down vis-à-vis the judiciary. The economy, 
almost entirely nationalized, could produce only meager economic growth for 
decades. This state of affairs lasted until 1989 when the nationalized economy 
started to show increasing signs of stagnation. This was coupled with the 
United States pushing Costa Rica and the entire region toward de-
nationalization. A wide-ranging constitutional reform was introduced in 1989 to 
assuage the growing discontent emerging in the wake of the expanding 
economic crisis, and this reform caused more radical changes in the functioning 
of the Costa Rican judiciary than planned (cf. MORA 2000; 
WILSON/HANDBERG 1998). 
Although the justices of the Constitutional Court have been empowered 
prior to these reforms with running constitutional checks on laws and decrees 
promulgated by the head of state, but the judges with roots in the mentality of 
Continental Europe and attached to the provisions of the laws qualified the 
provisions attacked as unconstitutional only in a very limited number of cases. 
This has also been made difficult that such decision could be brought only by a 
two-third majority of 17 judges at the plenary session of the supreme judiciary 
forum, and this could be ensured only at considerable exertion. Regardless, 
however, there has been no genuine effort aimed at a check of legislative 
provisions based on abstract constitutional norms. 
This has been changed profoundly following the 1989 constitutional reform. 
A constitutional judiciary organ, the Sala Courta has been established as the 
new chamber of the Supreme Court, introducing, here, too, the method of 
electability by the parliament and automatic renewal of the term for eight years 
here in the lack of a two-third vote for removal from office. In addition, the 
function of the new chamber to run constitutionality checks has been made 
easier by making it so that this body can pronounce by itself alone and not at 
the plenary session of the Supreme Court on the unconstitutionality of laws and 
decrees, and it needs no more for this than a simple majority. (Four votes out of 
seven constitutional judges suffice.) At the level of the legal framework, the 
constitutionality check was able to achieve its potential also by the fact that the 
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amparo, the complaint on constitutional grounds, was made very easy. Anyone, 
even a child or a foreigner can file, without any formality or legal 
representation, with the Sala Courta, a complaint on constitutional grounds just 
by signing, if he/she feels that his/her constitutional rights have been violated 
either on the part of the state or any individual. However, in addition to the 
legal framework the more decisive factor was that, in 1989, the political elite 
and the mass media, under the conditions of a general discontent, lent its 
support to the new body and egged it on to act against the government and the 
legislation (see WILSON/HANDBERG 1998). Sensing this support, the new 
constitutional judges started, without much hesitation, the attacked legal 
provisions, and this has led to a skyrocketing of the number of amparos. 
Already in the first years, their number exceeded one thousand, but, by 1999, 
its number has passed ten thousand (MORA 2000). 
The new body of the Constitutional Court plays a double role. On the one 
hand, it has become the ultimate judicial forum over the entire judiciary sphere 
in specific tort cases. On the other, it has also become an alternative for the 
traditional parliamentary way of political fighting and lobbying. Interest 
groups, lobbyists, and other political forces resort already to constitutional 
arguments if one of their requests is rejected at the parliament. That is, we have 
been witnessing not only the “constitutionalization” of ordinary court rulings to 
a certain extent, but, equally, the battlefield of politics has also been 
transformed to include constitutional law as a tool of the arsenal.  
It should, of course, be noted that, according to information at hand, the 
“constitutionalization” of the court procedures has not transformed the 
judiciary in Costa Rica as much as that happened in the United States in the 
sixties. There, it is limited only to the constitutional judges of the Sala Courta, 
and the lower courts basically remain attached to the written laws and the 
underlying legal-dogmatic guidelines. Incidentally, this phenomenon can be 
observed in most of the Latin American countries where the constitutional 
courts have shown considerable activism, and those who support this talk about 
“the shackles of the tradition of Continental Europe,” and blame the resistance 
of legal cultures developing on this foundation for a lack of “constitutionality 
revolution” (cf. PEDONE 1995:7). However, the Sala Courta has been busy 
enough during the nineties to engineer, by itself, considerable changes in the 
social, economic and political conditions of Costa Rica. By closing the 
argument, it is worth mentioning that foreign researchers noticed the 
extraordinary activism of the constitutional judges in Costa Rica and that of the 
Hungarian constitutional judges in the beginning of the nineties, and, as a 
result, comparative studies have been made to this effect (see 
WILSON/GAAL/HANDBERG 2001; BOULANGER 2001). 
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4. The power of the judiciary in Hungary and in Eastern Europe  
 
The Hungarian judiciary was transformed at the time of the 1989 change of the 
system on the mould of the Western European model, and independence was 
guaranteed for the individual judges in their ruling. Judiciary administration 
and nomination in the judiciary have been transferred under the authority of the 
Minister of Justice. However, the broad authority of the supervising judges in 
administration, operation and finances of the courts over the individual judges 
and their career provides them, in spite of the declared independence in ruling, 
with an informal influence. This way, the Minister of Justice making a direct 
decision with regard to their nomination could have an influence on the 
tendency of court ruling. On the one hand, this problem gave an impetus to the 
need for stepping up the independence of the judiciary in the first yeas of the 
change of the system. On the other hand, the same impetus was given by the 
fact that the winner of the first parliamentary election in 1990 was a nationalist-
conservative government, and the overwhelming part of the judiciary, 
socialized during the decades of Communism, were dead set against this trend 
due to their political value system. Considering that the overwhelming majority 
of the social-economic elite disposing over the societal and economic resources 
were also facing the government with hostile intentions and attitudes as well as 
inimical interests, the separation of the judiciary as an independent power 
received the biggest possible support from the media and the shapers and 
makers of public discourse. With this backdrop, the verdicts of the 
Constitutional Court were increasingly forcing the legislature to allow the 
separation of the judiciary as an independent power (for a detailed analysis of 
the related decisions of the Constitutional Court, see POKOL 2003). In the wake 
of it, new acts have been passed from the end of 1997 on the legal status of the 
judiciary and the judiciary administration (Act LXVI of 1997 and Act LVII of 
1997) that made a radical break with the Western European model, and placed 
the judiciary sphere in Hungary onto solutions adopted in the countries of 
Southern Europe. 
We have seen in the first part of this study that judicial power and activism 
reaches its apogee vis-à-vis the rest of powers when changes occur in three 
dimensions at the same time: on the one hand, the judiciary is separated from 
the other branches of power in terms of its organization and remains 
inaccessible to them, and, on the other, internal political groups are organized 
in the judicial self-organization resting on the internal judiciary elections within 
the framework of internal judiciary elections, organizing one or the other part 
of the judiciary, and they carry out sustained political battles against each other; 
and, finally, if this separated and politicized judiciary is able to transform the 
practice of ruling into free deliberation by resorting to “constitutionalization”, 
that is, by pushing aside the laws or, at least, with their interpretation that is not 
burdened by considerations of the constitutional law. We have seen that this 
332 – BÉLA POKOL  
has become a reality in all these three dimensions in the United States (or, more 
precisely, in Costa Rica and Colombia regarding only the Supreme Court), and 
in the countries of Southern Europe, the third dimension, remaining truncated, 
prevented the judges and the entire judiciary to take over decisions affecting the 
control of society from the other branches of power. here, the judges and the 
prosecutors attached to the judges could forge ahead only by “criminalizing the 
political responsibility” that means, in terms of content, that the individual 
political forces attempt, in the fights fought within the politicized judiciary, to 
break the main political opponents also by using the judicial groups 
sympathizing with them, as we have seen it in Italy from 1993. 
The idiosyncrasies of the new Hungarian judiciary power should be looked 
at under this light. However, attention should be called right at the outset to the 
fact that the organization of this judicial power is, in Hungary, in its infancy, 
since the self-organizing judiciary brought together without any domestic 
precedence has set out on this road only a few years ago. Thus, only the legal 
framework and the legal provisions can be analyzed, and, expectedly, it is still a 
matter of years until the framework is “filled with life,” and the directions of 
this are not really visible yet. 
Regarding the legal framework, it can be said, however, that the separation 
of the judiciary in Hungary from the rest of the powers is quite vigorous, and, 
in essence, it corresponds to the Italian and Portuguese situations. (The 
Spaniards made a volte face on this road by “re-parliamentarizing” the election 
of the supreme judiciary body.) Thus, the entire judiciary administration, the 
nomination to top judiciary positions, the decision over the incorporation into 
the judiciary are matters to be decided by a local government at the highest 
level, the Board of National Justice (OIT). This body consists of 15 members, 
and the majority of them, nine judges, are elected indirectly by 2 500 
Hungarian justices through electors. Its Chairman is the President of the 
Supreme Court who is elected by the National Assembly for six years, but, due 
to his past as a judge that had socialized within the judiciary, he can be counted 
to side with the nine judges, and, this way, a two-third majority can be 
guaranteed at the OIT decisions. (In addition to these 10 judges, the Chief 
Public Prosecutor, the national chairman of the Bar Association, the Minister of 
Justice, and two, delegated MPs make up the remaining 5 of the 15-member 
body.) Through this body, with a majority of ten justices, the judiciary has a 
complete control over self-organization and operation, and the only obstacle 
standing – for the time being – not cleared away is a lack of automatic 
allocation of the budget of this body (by, for instance, setting a certain 
percentage of the government budget), but it is the government that decides 
annually in its budgetary plan. The current government plans, according to 
information available, to introduce such a mechanism, and, in this case, the 
judiciary would be a sphere that could not be accessed from without. 
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This means that the independence and separation of the judiciary from the 
rest of the powers is one of the most watertight cases in Hungary from among 
the countries of Europe.   
What is the situation of the politicization of the independent judiciary and 
its independent role playing, and what events are expected in this area? With 
regard to its political affiliation and values, the majority of the judiciary tend to 
favor the Socialists and the left-liberal Free Democrats, but no organizing along 
factional lines or any sign of coalition building of ideological enemies can be 
seen as of today. Looking at the legal framework, regulation tends to favor the 
maintenance of the amorphous and apolitical conditions in selecting members 
of the self-governing upper body, in distinction to the Italian case in which this 
process is equivalent to open political and associative warfare between groups 
of justices. The fact of the matter is that the nine members of the OIT are not 
elected for a six-year term directly by the judges, but by the interposition of a 
conference of the judiciary’s delegates, and the delegates are elected in 
isolation at the meeting of county justices or that of the justices of the capital, 
and, also, the Supreme Court and the High Court justices elect one delegate 
each. Every 40 judges elect a delegate at these conferences, and, this way, 
about 70 conferences nationwide send nine OIT-members and nine alternate 
members to this body. Thus, in want of a national organization, a narrow 
coterie of judges can, presumably, have their influence felt at the selection of 
persons recommended for membership. This influence could be broken on the 
part of the judges of the lower courts only by a national organization, but this 
would lead, necessarily to a severe break up of the judiciary along political 
fault line just as it has happened in Italy, and, as the visible signs indicate, even 
in Spain. 
It is also important to stress that with the above transformation the 
independence of the judiciary has developed only vis-à-vis the rest of the 
powers, since the individual judges have become, if possible, even more 
integrated into the judiciary in terms of livelihood, promotion and other factors. 
But, the fact of the matter is that verdicts now can be influenced not from the 
other branches of power, but within the judiciary. This, incidentally, fits 
completely into the South European model, and this stands in sharp contrast 
with the type of judicial independence in the United States that separates, at 
least at the level of the federal judges, not only the entire judiciary sphere from 
the rest of the powers, but makes the individual judge independent even from 
the influence exerted within the judiciary. 
Thus, the situation of the Hungarian judiciary can be described by a strong 
degree of independence and a lack of politicization, and this resembles most of 
the Portuguese situation among the European countries. It is also important to 
note that Hungarian prosecutors have traditionally been separate from the 
judiciary and the subordination of the individual prosecutors to their higher-ups 
is strong, and, thus, the situation of the Hungarian prosecutors is diametrically 
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opposed to the independent role of the Italian prosecutors vis-à-vis the judges. 
With regard to the legal framework, the political role playing of the Chief 
Public Prosecutor in Portugal is a theoretical possibility in Hungary for even if 
the government majority of the day is able to choose a new Chief Public 
Prosecutor with a 50 percent casting of the votes, this is not probable due to 
assessment made from without. However, this potential has not been realized 
during the past decades. “The criminalization of the political responsibility” 
that meant the main terrain for the judiciary power in the countries of Southern 
Europe does not exist in Hungary, although this threat is sometimes voiced on 
the occasions of political bouts. 
A full development of the judiciary power can take place only hand-in-hand 
with the “constitutionalization” of the ruling when court verdicts, competing 
with influences on the issue of social control, also take their place next to 
parliamentary decisions. The fact of the matter is that there are some efforts 
made in this direction on the parts of a handful of small coteries of legal 
politicians, but, so far, they have been unable to gain wider currency for their 
ideas. This pressure is reflected most directly in the area of civil law judgments 
in the sense that the undersecretary of the Minister of Justice responsible for 
civil matters has often tried to shift civil law judgments toward the 
constitutional law, for instance in the codification work of the civil code, but 
his efforts ran aground on the resistance exercised by the civil law attorneys. 
The former government also tried to brave these efforts, and, therefore, it will 
be interesting to see how, following the change of government, the current 
Minister of Justice who is closer to the Free Democrats will take up the 
challenge presented by the profession in this area, and will introduce those 
amendments that push toward “constitutionalization.” This cannot yet be seen, 
just like the politicization of the judiciary, or, the best scenario, its non-
occurrence. However, it can be emphasized that the shift in sentencing to a 
freer deliberation on the basis of the constitutional law and, through this, 
bringing  wider social issues in front of the courts may accelerate the break-up 
of the judiciary into internal political groups, while a more stringent attachment 
to the laws and sentencing only in narrower legal disputes hampers this 
possibility. 
In the countries of Eastern Europe, it was Hungary where the effort aimed at 
developing a separate judiciary vis-à-vis the parliamentary majority and the 
government was the most successful. As mentioned, the National Assembly in 
Hungary has the only right to elect the President of the Supreme Court who is, 
at the same time, the Chairman of the judicial local government. Considering, 
however, that this vote also needs a two-third majority, no simply parliamentary 
majority of the government suffices. And if the parliamentary majority and the 
opposition fail to agree over the person of the new President to be elected every 
six years, it is the Vice President of the Supreme court that continues to fill this 
position since his/her mandate is for an indefinite term, and the separate 
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judiciary has no impediment to work off. The fact of the matter is that the only 
instrument to exercise pressure with on the judiciary is the budget allocated to 
the justices. This independence and isolation from the parliamentary majority is 
of the highest degree among the countries in Europe, and, in Southern Europe, 
it is only the Italian and the Portuguese judiciary that can be somewhat 
compared to it. 
With regard to the supreme bodies of the judiciary local governments 
developed in the rest of Eastern Europe, the Lithuanians came close to this 
measure of independence by their judiciary reform introduced in May 2002, but 
a number of authorities were not handed over to the judiciary self-government 
there either, and these licences remained with the head of state, and the 
judiciary body plays only an advisory role in it. In the case of the Poles and the 
Slovenes – while the judiciary remained subordinated to the administration by 
the Ministry of Justice, this role has also remained strong in the appointment of 
the leading justices – the supreme judiciary self-governing body has a material 
role as well. The legal standing of the judicial self-governing body is similar to 
the one employed in Poland and Slovenia, but it has more limited authority than 
in the latter countries. The list is followed by the Latvian and the Bulgarian 
self-government body of the judiciary with even more limited independence. 
The Czechs and the Esthonians simply resisted the constant pressure coming 
from the mechanism of the European Union to separate the judiciary as an 
independent power: their national legislations rejected efforts aimed at 
implementing these recommended changes (Open Society Institute 2002). In 
essence, it is the traditional administrative rights of the Minister of Justice  that 
prevail in both countries. However, the Constitutional Court in the Czech 
Republic entered the fray in the summer of 2002, and squashed, on 
constitutional grounds, the judiciary model organized around the Minister of 
Justice. It is not known how the Czech parliament will decide in the future, but 
it can be surmised that the self-governing judiciary model will be included in 
the new regulation. (There are no news on such plans on the part of the 
Esthonians.) Finally, we should mention the case of Romania where, although, 
by way of camouflage, a judicial self-governing organ was created, the Ministry 
of Justice keeps full control over the courts, and, in addition, it can also monitor 
the individual justices through its inspection system, even during cases in 
process.  
As to the prosecution, the differences among the three countries can be 
summarized in three major models. One of these models is the prosecution as 
an independent body that is separate from the government and the Ministry of 
Justices. Here, the hierarchy of the prosecutors with the Chief Prosecutor at its 
apex, reports only to the parliament, which represents an almost full degree of 
autonomy for the prosecution in terms of the way the legislation operates. 
However, the prosecutor, as an individual, is completely subordinated to the 
supervising prosecutor; the supervising prosecutor is subordinated to the 
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supervising prosecutor at the next level in the hierarchy, and, ultimately, all the 
prosecutors are subordinated to the Chief Prosecutor. This model includes 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania. In the next model, the prosecutors are 
answerable directly to the Minister of Justice who guides, in every major 
aspect, the daily operation of the prosecution from the promotion to the 
appointment of the prosecutors and the ongoing overseeing process. The most 
ideal typical case of the model is the Polish one where the Minister of Justice is 
the same person as the Chief Prosecutor, and the “national prosecutor,” 
meaning the “official prosecutor,” functions as his direct subordinate. However, 
the Czechs and the Romanians also belong to this model.  
Finally, Slovenia and Esthonia cling to the third model in terms of the 
hierarchy of prosecution. Whereas the prosecution are not separate from the 
government and the Ministry of Justice in these two countries, the legal 
standing of the prosecutor has been brought closer to the that of the justices, 
and the individual justices can no longer be instructed. This means that they did 
not create the independence of the prosecution vis-à-vis the government, but the 
individual prosecutors are independent even from their fellow prosecutors and 
the Chief Public Prosecutor. 
 
 
5. Summary: some distinctions to understand the power of the judiciary and the 
prosecutors 
 
In the wake of this comparative analysis, we are already able to stress those 
distinctions that may help the analyst understand the power of the judiciary and 
the prosecutors in a given country and to pass a judgment over the degree and 
nature of this power. 
 
I. Major aspects of the judicial power: 
– independence or lack of it in terms of organization and constitutional 
law 
– politicization or lack of it 
– placing or not placing sentencing on free deliberation  
 
II. Directions in the development of judicial power: 
– taking over decisions in controlling society from the parliament and the 
executive by the courts (model: United States) 
– criminalization of the political battles (model: United States and Italy) 
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III. Two models of the independence of the judiciary in terms of 
organization and constitutional law 
– independence of the judicial corporation; an independent judiciary as 
separate from the rest of the powers, within it the individual judges 
subordinated to the judicial corporation (All the European countries 
in which the judiciary has been separated from the parliamentary 
majority, and the Latin American countries) 
– independence of the individual judges (model: USA) 
 
IV. Models of relations between the judiciary and the prosecutors: 
– complete separation of the two; prosecutors subordinated to the 
Ministry of Justice or the government (Western Europe) 
– body of prosecutors intertwined with the judiciary; the separation of 
the two from the rest of the powers (Italy) 
– completely autonomous prosecutors from the judiciary with automatic 
budgetary allocation (Columbia) 
– semi-separation of the prosecutors’ hierarchy ending at its apex in the 
Chief Public Prosecutor, making it possible by their joint attachment 
to two, competing, power centers (Portugal). 
 
V. Levels of politicization of the judiciary 
– judiciary remaining completely apolitical (Portugal) 
– political activity and politicization limited to the Supreme Court (Costa 
Rica, Columbia, and, in general, countries of Latin America) 
– politicization of the entire judiciary and the formation of political 
camps within the judiciary (federal justices in the USA, Italy). 
 
VI. Levels of politicization of the prosecutors 
– political activity limited to the Chief Public Prosecutor and his 
entourage (Portugal) 
– politicization of the entire prosecutors’ hierarchy and formation of 
political camps of the prosecutors (Italy) 
 
VII. Levels of making sentencing based on the constitutional law 
– complete lack of transforming sentencing to be based on the 
constitutional law (Hungary, Austria, and most of the countries in 
Western Europe) 
– effect of the constitutional rights partly incorporated in the 
interpretation of the law (Germany) 
– “constitutionalizing” limited to specific constitutional provisions (Italy) 
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– decisions made in factional infighting in lieu of full 
“constitutionalizing” (USA, Columbia, Costa Rica). 
 
By taking into consideration these major differences, we can give a nuanced 
response, not losing the specific differences between the individual countries if 
we want to carry out a scientific analysis with regard to a country concerning 
the existence of the power of the judiciary, its degree and nature. Scientific 
inquiry may proceed more consciously instead of a diffuse and opaque 
questioning practices by stressing these differences. In the wake of comparative 
analyses and the emerging differences, we are able to shed light on the 
structural elements in an inductive manner; to arrange them in clusters, and, as 
a combination of these clusters, understand the idiosyncrasies of the power of 
the judiciary and prosecutors in the countries under investigation. 
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POKOL BÉLA 
 
A BÍRÓI HATALOM FORMÁI 
 
(Összefoglaló) 
 
A tanulmány a bírói hatalom különbözõ formáit elemzi a modern 
demokráciákban. Hosszabb vizsgálódások foglalkoznak az Egyesült 
Államokban végbement „alapjogi forradalommal”, és ennek a bírói 
ítélkezésben megfigyelhetõ utóhatásaival. Ugyanígy vizsgálat alá került a 
politikai küzdelem büntetõjogiasítása, ahogy az különösen Olaszországban és 
Latin-Amerika országaiban figyelhetõ meg. Elemzések találhatók a tanulmány-
ban Közép-Kelet-Európa államaiban – így Lengyelországban, Szlovákiában, 
Szlovéniában és Magyarországon – a bírói kar hatalmának növekedésére és 
ennek okaira. A tanulmány a magyar bírói ítélkezõ tevékenység vizsgálata 
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alapján von le következtetéseket a magyar bírói hatalom mûködésére, amelyet a 
szerzõ a Fõvárosi Bíróságon empirikusan végzett. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 Zusammenfassung 
 
 
 
Die Studie analysiert die verschiedenen Formen der richterlichen Macht in der 
modernen Demokratien. Langere Untesuchungen de Studie beschaftigen sich 
mit der Grundrechtsrevolution in der Vereinigten Staaten und ihre 
Nachwirkungen auf die alltagliche Urteilstatigkeit der Gerichte, mit der 
Kriminalisierung des politischen Wettbewebs, wie es in Italy und in der Latin-
Amerikanischen Landern beobachtet werden kann. Es gibt Untersuchungen in 
der Studie über die Erweiterungen der richterlichen Macht  in Ost-Mittel-
Europe, Poland, Slowakien, Slowenien, Ungarn etc. In einem Kapitel 
geschaftigt sich der Verfasser mit der Entscheidungstatigkeit der Gerichte in 
Ungarn und dieser Kapitel ist basiert auf eine empirishce 
Entscheidungsuntesuchung, die der Verfasser  in dem Hauptgericht von 
Budapest gemacht hat. 
 
 
 
 
